In this richly detailed analysis, Barbara Von Eckardt lays the foundations for understanding what it means to be a cognitive scientist.

This book represents the views of one of the greatest mathematicians of the twentieth century on the analogies between computing machines and the living human brain.

Moral behaviour, based on social norms, is commonly regarded as a hallmark of humans. Hitherto, humans are perceived to be the only species possessing social norms and to engage in moral behaviour. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting their presence in chimpanzees, but systematic studies are lacking. Here, we examine the evolution of human social norms and their underlying psychological mechanisms. For this, we distinguish between conventions, cultural social norms and universal social norms. We aim at exploring whether chimpanzees possess evolutionary (...) precursors of universal social norms seen in humans. Chimpanzees exhibit important preconditions for their presence and enforcement: tolerant societies, well-developed social-cognitive skills and empathetic competence. Here, we develop a theoretical framework for recognizing different functional levels of social norms and distinguish them from mere statistical behavioural regularities. Quasi social norms are found where animals behave functionally moral without having moral emotions. In proto social norms, moral emotions might be present but cannot be collectivized due to the absence of a uniquely human psychological trait, i.e. shared intentionality. Human social norms, whether they are universal or cultural, involve moral emotions and are collectivized. We will discuss behaviours in chimpanzees that represent potential evolutionary precursors of human universal social norms, with special focus on social interactions involving infants. We argue that chimpanzee infants occupy a special status within their communities and propose that tolerance towards them might represent a proto social norm. Finally, we discuss possible ways to test this theoretical framework. (shrink)

Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien ist ein unveranderter, hochwertiger Nachdruck der Originalausgabe aus dem Jahr 1880. Hansebooks ist Herausgeber von Literatur zu unterschiedlichen Themengebieten wie Forschung und Wissenschaft, Reisen und Expeditionen, Kochen und Ernahrung, Medizin und weiteren Genres.Der Schwerpunkt des Verlages liegt auf dem Erhalt historischer Literatur.Viele Werke historischer Schriftsteller und Wissenschaftler sind heute nur noch als Antiquitaten erhaltlich. Hansebooks verlegt diese Bucher neu und tragt damit zum Erhalt selten gewordener Literatur und historischem Wissen auch fur die (...) Zukunft bei.". (shrink)

Volume 2, part 1 "herausgegeben von Georg Braungart; begrèundet von Ernst Behler in Zusammenarbeit mit Frank Jolles;" volume 3 "begrèundet von Ernst Behler und Frank Jolles; herausgegeben von Claudia Becker.".

In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. (...) The question then arises of how the self can be both deceiver and deceived. We propose that this is achieved through dissociations of mental processes, including conscious versus unconscious memories, conscious versus unconscious attitudes, and automatic versus controlled processes. Given the variety of methods for deceiving others, it should come as no surprise that self-deception manifests itself in a number of different psychological processes, and we discuss various types of self-deception. We then discuss the interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of self-deception before considering the levels of consciousness at which the self can be deceived. Finally, we contrast our evolutionary approach to self-deception with current theories and debates in psychology and consider some of the costs associated with self-deception. (shrink)

Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) gilt - neben Max Weber - als einer der beiden Gründerväter der modernen Soziologie. Er hat durch seine materialen Arbeiten nicht nur so zentrale soziologische Teildisziplinen wie die Religions-, Wissens-, Familien- und Rechtssoziologie begründet, sondern insbesondere durch sein theoretisches Werk der Soziologie als eigenständiger Wissenschaft den Weg geebnet. Hierzu trug er nicht zuletzt auch durch die Begründung einer soziologischen Zeitschrift und Formierung einer eigenen Denkschule bei. Trotz seines internationalen Renommees blieb sein Werk in der deutschen Theoriediskussion stets (...) eigentümlich vernachlässigt. Der erste Einführungsband über das Werk Durkheims in deutscher Sprache beschreibt die zeitgeschichtlichen und biografischen Hintergründe seines Lebens und erläutert die Ausgangsprobleme, die die Soziologie in den Augen ihres Begründers lösen sollte. Die Quintessenz seines soziologischen Werks wird in der Begründung einer rationalen Moral resümiert. Nach der Ausleuchtung der konkreten Gestalt, die Durkheim dem soziologischen Denken übertrug, widmet sich Daniel Šuber eingängig der wissenssoziologischen Relevanz des Durkheim'schen Werks. Gilt er gemeinhin nicht als deren Begründer, wird hier gezeigt, wie tief sein Denkansatz von der wissenssoziologischen Grundidee der ”Seinsbedingtheit allen Denkens“ (Mannheim) von Beginn an geprägt war. Die rekonstruierten Fallbeispiele werden dem religionssoziologischen Spätwerk, aber auch seinen früheren Arbeiten zur Familien-, Erziehungs- und Moralsoziologie entnommen. Abschließend wird die über ethnologische Autoren (E.E. Evans-Pritchard, C. Lévi-Strauss, M. Douglas) vermittelte Wirkungsgeschichte des Durkheim'schen Werks in der Nachkriegssoziologie skizziert. (shrink)

Ramsey (1997) argues that connectionist representations ‘do not earn their explanatory keep’. The aim of this paper is to examine the argument Ramsey gives to support that conclusion. In doing so, I identify two kinds of explanatory need—need relative to a possible explanation and need relative to a true explanation and argue that internal representations are not needed for either connectionist or non‐connectionist possible explanations but that it is quite likely that they are needed for true explanations. However, to show (...) that the latter is the case requires more than a consideration of the form of explanation involved. (shrink)

Die Erkenntnistheorie wird meist als Theorie des Wissens charakterisiert. In jüngerer Zeit ist der alleinige Fokus auf Wissen kritisiert und sind weitere epistemische Güter diskutiert worden. Verstehen und Weisheit sind von besonderer Bedeutung. Erstens ist Verstehen ein hohes und Weisheit vielleicht das höchste epistemische Gut; beide scheinen epistemisch wertvoller zu sein als Wissen (Riggs 2003). Zudem ist unklar, ob der epistemische Wert von Wissen den Wert seiner Bestandteile (z.B. wahre, gerechtfertigte Meinung) übersteigt. Es ist behauptet worden, dass sich für Verstehen (...) kein solches Wertproblem stellt und die Erkenntnistheorie deshalb Verstehen ins Zentrum rücken sollte (Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard 2010). Zweitens ist Verstehen ein Ziel von Wissenschaft (Elgin 2017) und von wissenschaftlicher Erklärung (Friedman 1974). Theorien der Erklärung und der kognitiven Leistungen der Wissenschaft verlangen deshalb nach einer Theorie des Verstehens (de Regt u.a. 2009). Drittens mag ein geeigneter Begriff des Verstehens es erlauben, tiefsitzende Intuitionen zur epistemischen Rechtfertigung anzuerkennen, die für Wissen zurückgewiesen wurden, z.B. internalistische und kohärentistische Intuitionen sowie solche zur Rolle von intellektuellen Charaktertugenden (Riggs 2003; Zagzebski 1996). Diese Idee ist kürzlich kritisiert (z.B. Greco 2014) und dafür vorgeschlagen worden, dass solche Intuitionen Merkmale von Weisheit betreffen (Grimm u.a. 2017, Kap. 10). Dieser Artikel behandelt die Natur von Verstehen und von Weisheit, indem er Verstehen mit Wissen und beide mit Weisheit vergleicht (für die Wertfrage s. Kap. „Der Wert des Wissens“). (shrink)

Collective emotions are at the heart of any society and become evident in gatherings, crowds, or responses to widely salient events. However, they remain poorly understood and conceptualized in scientific terms. Here, we provide first steps towards a theory of collective emotions. We first review accounts of the social and cultural embeddedness of emotion that contribute to understanding collective emotions from three broad perspectives: face-to-face encounters, culture and shared knowledge, and identification with a social collective. In discussing their strengths and (...) shortcomings and highlighting areas of conceptual overlap, we translate these views into a number of bottom–up mechanisms that explain collective emotion elicitation on the levels of social cognition, expressive behavior, and social practices. (shrink)

The compositional semantics of sentences like Only mammals give live birth and The flag flies only if the Queen is home is a tough problem. Evidence is presented to show that only here is modifying an underlying proposition (its ‘prejacent’). After discussing the semantics of only, the question of the proper interpretation of the prejacent is explored. It would be nice if the prejacent could be analyzed as having existential quantificational force. But that is difficult to maintain, since the prejacent (...) structures when encountered on their own are naturally read as having a lawlike flavor, which in many analyses is attributed to the semantics of implicit operators alleged to be present in them. In the end, an analysis is presented which attributes some very particular properties to these operators and thereby succeeds in providing the target sentences with intuitively adequate interpretations. These complex constructions can therefore be used as a probe into the nature of implicit quantification in natural language. (shrink)

This article contains an overview of the author's long‐standing involvement with deontic logic, both from a technical and from a wider philosophical point of view. As far as the formal aspects of deontic logic are concerned, the author describes his intellectual development from the original discovery of the analogy between modal (and deontic) notions on the one hand, and quantifiers on the other, through the formulation of a systematic theory of dyadic deontic concepts, to the proposal of a formal logic (...) of action as a foundation for deontic logic. In a more philosophical vein, the author discusses such questions as the very possibility of deontic logic if norms have no truth‐value, the relation between the descriptive interpretation of classical deontic logic and the logic of norm‐propositions, the correct representation of conditional or hypothetical norms, the distinction between moral obligation and practical necessity, and the interdefinability of permission and obligation. (shrink)

After a general remark about Armstrong’s conception of ontology, I raise objections against this view and defend an alternative account of the connection between particulars and their properties, involving a kind of ontological dependence which is different from Armstrong’s necessary connection between particulars and their properties.

Why are some conditionals subjunctive? It is often assumed that at least one crucial difference is that subjunctive conditionals presuppose that their antecedent is false, that they are counterfactual (Lakoff 1970). The traditional theory has apparently been refuted. Perhaps the clearest counter-example is one given by Alan Anderson (1951: 37): If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show. A typical place to use such a subjunctive conditional would be in (...) the course of an argument that tries to bolster the hypothesis that Jones did in fact take arsenic. But then it would of course be self-defeating to presuppose that the hypothesis is false. Thus, something else must be going on. (shrink)

At first glance, this is an entirely unremarkable kind of sentence. It is easy to find naturally occuring exponents. Its meaning is also clear: taking the A train is a necessary condition for going to Harlem. Hence the term “anankastic conditional”, Ananke being the Greek protogonos of inevitability, compulsion and necessity.

1 This paper has been presented at the workshop “Time and Modality: A Round Table on Tense, Mood, and Modality”, Paris, December 2005, at a CUNY linguistics colloquium in May 2006, and at the 6th Workshop on Formal Linguistics in Florian´opolis, Brazil, August 2006. We thank the audiences at those presentations, in particular Orin Percus, Tim Stowell, Marcel den Dikken, Anna Szabolcsi, Chris Warnasch, Roberta Pires de Oliveira, Renato Miguel Basso, and Ana M¨uller. We thank Noam Chomsky, Cleo Condoravdi, and (...) Irene Heim for very helpful conversations about this material. We thank Bridget Copley for sharing with us her recent manuscript “What Should Should.. (shrink)

For the first time a uniform compositional derivation is given for quantified sentences containing exceptive constructions. The semantics of exceptives is primarily one of subtraction from the domain of a quantifier. The crucial semantic difference between the highly grammaticized but-phrases and free exceptives is that the former have the Uniqueness Condition as part of their lexical meaning whereas the latter are mere set subtractors. Several empirical differences between the two types of exceptives are shown to follow from this basic lexical (...) difference. (shrink)

Beziehungen sind nicht gegeben, sie werden gemeinsam gemacht. Der Band untersucht Relationalitäten als prozessuale Aushandlungen zwischen Künsten und Wissenschaften, zwischen gebautem Raum und sozialem Körper, zwischen theoretischem und poetisch-künstlerischem Schreiben und Sprechen, zwischen Form, Material und Handlung. Plädiert wird für eine Wissenspolitik der Künste, die von einer radikalen Verstricktheit theoretischer, ästhetischer, medialer und gesellschaftlicher Praktiken und Techniken ausgeht. Mit Beiträgen von / with contributions by Bini Adamczak, Emily Apter, Alice Chauchat, Beatriz Colomina, Gradinger / Schubot, Annika Haas, Maximilian Haas, Orit (...) Halpern, Tom Holert, Amy Lien & Enzo Camacho, Maurício Liesen, Hanna Magauer, Michaela Ott, Sibylle Peters, Dennis Pohl, Possible Bodies (Helen Pritchard, Jara Rocha, Femke Snelting), Ghassan Salhab, Mirjam Schaub, Melanie Sehgal, Nora Sternfeld, Kathrin Thiele, Jeremy Wade, Brigitte Weingart. (shrink)

This paper is mainly concerned with tense in embedded constructions. I believe that recent research – notably the work by Ogihara (1989) and Abusch (1993) – has contributed much to our better understanding of its semantics. The proposals made by the two authors are, however, still too simplistic in some regards. Among other things, they neglect the interplay of tense with temporal adverbs of quantification and with frame-setters. To get this composition right is a touchstone for every theory of tense (...) and tense semanticists have been concerned with this problem from the beginning on, as witnessed by the analyses in Kratzer (1978), Bäuerle (1979), Dowty (1979/1982), to mention a few. (shrink)

The interpretation of if -clauses in the scope of ordinary quantifiers has provoked semanticists into extraordinary measures, such as abandoning compositionality or claiming that if has no meaning. We argue that if -clauses have a normal conditional meaning, even in the scope of ordinary quantifiers, and that the trick is to have the right semantics for conditionals.

This article concerns a new constraint on the interaction of quantifier phrases and epistemic modals. It is argued that QPs cannot bind their traces across an epistemic modal, though it is shown that scoping mechanisms of a differentnature are permitted to cross epistemic modals. The nature and source of this constraint are investigated.

"Agreement" is the key notion in Wittgenstein's explanation of the possibility of public language. Agreement in judgements constitutes the justification for asserting agreement in definitions. The determinates of rules are empirical; rules as determinables are transcendental. Rules are on the limit of public language, and not within it. Wittgenstein's skeptical solutions to skepticism about language and about the given are transcendentalistic. His skeptical solutions in other areas are conventionalistic. Skepticism about mental phenomena is not solved because of a systematic rule-gap (...) for the application of non-dispositional psychological concepts. (shrink)

"Agreement" is the key notion in Wittgenstein's explanation of the possibility of public language. Agreement in judgements constitutes the justification for asserting agreement in definitions. The determinates of rules are empirical; rules as determinables are transcendental. Rules are on the limit of public language, and not within it. Wittgenstein's skeptical solutions to skepticism about language and about the given are transcendentalistic. His skeptical solutions in other areas are conventionalistic. Skepticism about mental phenomena is not solved because of a systematic rule-gap (...) for the application of non-dispositional psychological concepts. (shrink)

We challenge the idea that a cognitive perspective on therapeutic change concerns only memory processes. We argue that inclusion of impairments in more generative cognitive processes is necessary for complete understanding of cases such as depression. In such cases what is identified in the target article as an “integrative memory structure” is crucially supported by processes of mental model construction.

El resurgimiento de la educación tradicional en los Estados Unidos ha generado un intenso debate en la esfera pública. Este artículo examina el debate discursivo que rodea este fenómeno. A medida que las críticas hacia los enfoques educativos progresistas se intensifican, defensores de la educación tradicional argumentan a favor de un retorno a métodos pedagógicos más tradicionales. Este resumen destaca el papel de la esfera pública como espacio de conflicto y negociación de ideas en torno a la educación. Al explorar (...) las perspectivas y los argumentos en disputa, el artículo busca arrojar luz sobre el resurgimiento de la educación tradicional y su impacto en el sistema educativo de los Estados Unidos. (shrink)

Narrative imagination, as MarthaNussbaum (1996) discusses it, is ``the abilityto be an intelligent reader of another person'sstory'', an ability tied to being a democraticand cultivated world citizen, one whounderstands the lives of others. Narrativeimagination does not only need knowledge andlogical reasoning but also love and compassion.This article argues that in order to be agenuine tool for democracy, narrativeimagination and consciously taking theperspective of others has to be based on anunderstanding of humans as basicallypluralistic, as homines aperti. Criticalexamination and reflection should (...) be broughtcloser to the lives we live and confront ourhabits and implicit values in order tocultivate us as humans so that we are genuinelyaffected and touched. (shrink)

Our immediate intuition about (1) is that –ever indicates speaker’s ignorance. We hear the speaker as signaling that she doesn’t know what Arlo is cooking, while at the same time asserting that no matter what Arlo is cooking, there’s a lot of garlic in it. The FR without –ever in (2) carries no such signal of ignorance.

Summary Verbs of creation (create, make, paint) are not transparent. The object created does not exist during the event time but only thereafter. We may call this type of opacity temporal opacity. I is to be distinguished from modal opacity, which is found in verbs like owe or seek. (Dowty, 1979) offers two analyses of creation verbs. One analysis predicts that no object of the sort created exists before the time of the creation. The other analysis says that the object (...) exists throughout the act of creation. I investigate three theories: Theory I says that no object of the sort created and which is caused by the very act of creation exists before the creation. In this theory, verbs of creation must embed a property. Theory II can regard the indefinite object of a creation verb as a quantifier and gives it wide scope with respect to the verb. The theory has to make sure that the objects quantified over exist only after the event. While Theory I and II start from the assumption that the extension of all nouns depend on time, Theory III says that Individual Level predicates do not depend on time. This ontology will enable us to treat verbs of creation as first order relations. The theory will entail that a picture does not mean the same as there is a picture. The paper discusses various approaches to the problem: Krifka, Parsons, Landman, Kratzer and Zucchi. (shrink)

Synchronistic or psi phenomena are interpreted as entanglement correlations in a generalized quantum theory. From the principle that entanglement correlations cannot be used for transmitting information, we can deduce the decline effect, frequently observed in psi experiments, and we propose strategies for suppressing it and improving the visibility of psi effects. Some illustrative examples are discussed.